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White matter maturation is associated with the
emergence of Theory of Mind in early childhood
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The ability to attribute mental states to other individuals is crucial for human cognition.
A milestone of this ability is reached around the age of 4, when children start understanding
that others can have false beliefs about the world. The neural basis supporting this critical
step is currently unknown. Here, we relate this behavioural change to the maturation of white
matter structure in 3- and 4-year-old children. Tract-based spatial statistics and probabilistic
tractography show that the developmental breakthrough in false belief understanding is
associated with age-related changes in local white matter structure in temporoparietal
regions, the precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex, and with increased dorsal white matter
connectivity between temporoparietal and inferior frontal regions. These effects are inde-
pendent of co-developing cognitive abilities. Our findings show that the emergence of mental
state representation is related to the maturation of core belief processing regions and their
connection to the prefrontal cortex.
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H
umans have the ability to represent what other people
think and believe. This implies that we are able to
understand that beliefs may differ from reality and,
therefore, that people can have false beliefs about the world.
This ability allows us to predict how a person with a false
belief about the world will act so that we can adjust our own
actions accordingly. As such, Theory of Mind (ToM) constitutes a
key role for complex interaction between human individuals,
including behaviours such as cooperation, social communication
and morality1,2. Understanding that others can have false beliefs
is considered to be a crucial test for ToM3. In childhood, there is a
developmental breakthrough between the ages of 3 and 4 years,
when children start passing standard false belief tests4,5. In these
tests, subjects are asked to predict how an agent with a false belief
about an object, typically concerning its location, content or
nature, will act4–6. It has been argued that the breakthrough seen
in these tests reflects a fundamental change in children’s
understanding of other agents, and that at this age children
start to build representations of others’ mental states, which can
thus differ from reality6. The behavioural emergence of a
representational ToM has been studied and debated extensively.
The neural mechanisms that enable this crucial step in the
development of human social cognition, however, remain largely
unknown. In the present study, we therefore investigated
developmental changes in brain structure between the ages of 3
and 4 years that were related to the emergence of false belief
understanding.
In adults, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies have shown that ToM tasks recruit a bilateral network
including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) and
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, tempor-
oparietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and
middle temporal gyrus (MTG), temporal pole, precuneus (PC)
and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)7,8. Recent meta-analytic
evidence suggests activation in differential networks for different
types of ToM tasks, where false belief understanding specifically
recruits a fronto-temporoparietal network including the TPJ,
STS/MTG, PC and MPFC7. One drawback of such studies on
false belief understanding is that they have often used tasks that
have been developed for preschool-aged children in adults. It is
unknown if the maturation of these brain regions implicated in
false belief tasks in adults are associated with the emergence of
ToM in childhood. Given the distributed network of regions
involved in belief processing in adults, we hypothesized that the
structural maturation of this network and its connectivity should
be important for the developmental breakthrough in explicit false
belief understanding between the ages of 3 and 4 years.
To date, few developmental imaging studies have been
conducted and all of these were with older children aged
6–12 years, when false belief understanding is already
well-established9–12. The only studies that approximated the age
at which false belief understanding emerges were restricted to
electroencephalography (EEG)13,14. One of these studies13 found
individual differences in resting-state alpha oscillation related
to ToM performance in the right TPJ and the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, suggesting that the maturation of these regions
is relevant for the emergence of false belief understanding.
Although EEG signal recorded at the scalp only allows an
approximate localization of the observed effects, these findings
raise the hypothesis of the relevance of the connection between
these brain regions. The present neuroimaging study therefore
sets out to identify which brain structures support the emergence
of false belief understanding.
The consistent functional activation of a distributed network of
brain regions involved in belief processing indicates that the
structural connections between these regions are important for
mature ToM. The maturation of these connections should
consequently be critical for the emergence of the ability in
childhood. Moreover, understanding the functional role of these
connections in the development of ToM might give insight into
the interrelation of the different regions within the network. This
can help us understand the cognitive and neural steps that lead to
the developmental breakthrough in explicit false belief under-
standing around the age of 4 years. Furthermore, it can shed light
on the functional building blocks of mature ToM and their
interaction in the developed brain network. Surprisingly, despite
its distributed consistent functional network, the structural
network involved in ToM has been studied very little to date.
Support for the relevance of structural connectivity for ToM
comes from studies with patients15,16. A study with patients with
resected gliomas along the associative white matter pathways
showed that impaired dorsal connectivity from posterior
temporal and parietal regions to the prefrontal cortex along the
arcuate fascicle and the cingulum correlated with ToM deficits15.
So far, however, connectivity has not been studied in the context
of false belief understanding, considered as the critical test of
ToM in development, and it remains an open question what role
the maturation of fibre connections plays for the developmental
breakthrough in ToM in early childhood.
In the present study, we therefore combined white matter
measures with behavioural performance in false belief tasks. This
was done by taking a developmental approach by studying
children with and without false belief understanding. We
hypothesized that the developmental breakthrough was related
to the white matter pathways connecting those regions that are
functionally involved in false belief reasoning in adults: (a) The
cingulum connects the PC and MPFC, (b) the corpus callosum
(CC) connects contralateral regions of the bilateral ToM network,
(c) temporoparietal-prefrontal connections link the TPJ with the
MPFC, ventrally via the inferior fronto-occipital fascicle (IFOF)
and dorsally via the superior longitudinal fascicle or arcuate
fascicle17,18.
The maturation of different long-range white matter pathways
during childhood is differentially related to cognitive develop-
ment in various domains19,20. A method that allows the
investigation of white matter is diffusion-weighted MRI
(dMRI), which measures the diffusion of water molecules in the
brain. This method provides parameters that reflect the structure
and organization of white matter because the diffusion depends
on tissue structure21. Fractional anisotropy (FA) is an index that
describes the directionality of diffusion. It is sensitive to axonal
organization and is modulated by fibre myelination and axonal
growth, especially during development22. During childhood FA
increases with age and, in the major fibre bundles, reaches its
maximum around the age of 20–40 years23. Tractography is a
method that allows the modelling of the fibre bundle pathways
and the resulting number of streamlines passing a given voxel is
interpreted as an index of connectivity strength24. In the present
study, we acquired dMRI data and computed FA as well as
streamline density from probabilistic tractography, which are
interpreted as measures of axonal organization and connectivity
strength, respectively. These measures were then set in relation to
behavioural performance on two standard false belief tasks4,5.
Children’s performance on standard false belief tasks has been
shown to correlate with their executive function25 and linguistic
abilities26. We therefore additionally assessed and controlled for a
battery of executive function and language tests27 to understand
to what extent the maturation of distinct brain structures
uniquely supported the emergence of false belief understanding.
Moreover, in the past decade, implicit false belief tasks have been
developed which showed that, already before the age of 2 years,
infants display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with
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a false belief in their looking behaviour28,29. However, whether
these early implicit expectations of false-belief-related behaviour
require representation of others’ mental states (as argued, for
example, by Baillargeon et al.30) is a matter of debate31,32. We
therefore additionally included an implicit task of belief-related
anticipatory looking27 to control for earlier-developing precursors
of explicit false belief understanding.
To summarize, the present study relates measures of white
matter organization and connectivity, gained from dMRI data of
43 children aged 3 and 4 years, to their performance on standard
false belief tests. At the same time, we controlled for co-
developing linguistic and executive functions, as well as earlier
developing implicit false-belief-related anticipation (see Meth-
ods). On the basis of functional studies with adults and older
children, we hypothesized age-related changes in white matter
structure near the TPJ, STS and MTG, PC, and MPFC, as well as
increased white matter connectivity between these regions to
correlate with children’s performance in the false belief tasks.
The present study shows an association of 3- and 4-year-olds’
false belief understanding with age-related changes in FA near the
TPJ, MTG, PC and MPFC, as well as with the age-independent
number of streamlines between temporoparietal and inferior
frontal regions. These associations were independent of co-
developing cognitive abilities. We conclude that the structural
maturation of regions that support belief processing in adults, and
their connection to the prefrontal cortex are important for the
emergence of ToM in early childhood.
Results
Behavioural results. The children performed two standard
explicit tests of false belief understanding. In a false location task4,
children were asked about the actions and belief of a puppet who
had a false belief about the location of a desired object. In a false
content task5, the children were asked about their own initial
belief and an ignorant puppet’s belief of the unexpected content
of a familiar box (for details see Methods). The performance on
an aggregate score of these tasks confirmed the well-documented
breakthrough in explicit false belief understanding to occur
around the age of 4 years: Three-year-old children performed
significantly below chance (M¼ 0.08, s.d.¼ 0.18, P¼ 0.0002, one-
sample Wilcoxon signed rank test against test-value 0.5), 4-year-
olds performed marginally above chance (M¼ 0.65, s.d.¼ 0.32,
P¼ 0.09), and there was a significant difference between the
age groups (P¼ 0.000002, Mann–Whitney U-test). To control
for co-developing abilities and early precursors of false belief
understanding, we assessed a standardized test of children’s
linguistic abilities33, a battery of executive function tests27 and
gaze anticipation of the actions of an agent with a false belief27
(see Methods).
Tract-based spatial statistics analysis. To see in which brain
regions white matter structure is implicated in false belief
understanding, we conducted a tract-based spatial statistics
(TBSS) analysis projecting the children’s FA values to a common
white matter skeleton (for details see Methods)34. This analysis
showed that higher false belief scores correlated with increased
FA values in the right TPJ and posterior MTG, the white matter
near the right vMPFC, right PC, left MTG, in medial portions of
the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and inferior temporal
gyrus (ITG), and in the left thalamus (see Fig. 1 and Table 1;
results are cluster size corrected at Po0.05).
The role of co-developing abilities. The reported correlations
of white matter structure and false belief scores remained sig-
nificant when controlling for executive functions, language and
belief-related anticipation as covariates in a multiple regression.
Only the clusters in the vMPFC and the thalamus were no longer
significant when controlling for all three executive function tests,
and the cluster in the pMTG/TPJ when controlling for sentence
comprehension. All other effects were specifically related to
explicit false belief understanding, independently of co-develop-
ing abilities and implicit precursors (for the correlations of FA
with executive functions, language and belief-related anticipation
see Supplementary Methods).
The role of age. Next, we wanted to find out whether the effects
were developmental, that is, due to age-related changes in FA, or
whether they stemmed from age-independent individual differ-
ences in FA. Including age as a covariate in the regression indi-
cated that the effects were age-related. To get a better
understanding of the role of age, we performed a voxelwise
commonality analysis, including FA and age as predictors for the
false belief scores. To make sure age-related changes in FA
specifically explained developments in explicit false belief
understanding and not in other cognitive domains, we addi-
tionally controlled for all other assessed cognitive measures as
covariates. Commonality analysis combines linear regressions on
the predictors of interest to allow the study of the unique and
shared linear contributions of intercorrelated predictors. This
analysis showed that the common effect of age and FA in the
reported regions significantly explained between 4 and 10% of the
variance in the false belief score, over and above the unique
contribution of age and of the other cognitive abilities (see
Supplementary Table 1). These results indicate that the effects
x = 38x = –47 x = 28 x = 47
0.01
 P
0.00
Figure 1 | TBSS analysis. Regions in which FA correlated with the children’s false belief score (N¼43, voxel-level P value colour coded in red-yellow, white
matter skeleton in blue): white matter close to the left MTG (x¼ 47), right vMPFC and PC (x¼ 28), right TPJ (x¼ 38), and right pMTG (x¼47), see also
Table 1. Reported coordinates are transformed to MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space. The results were significant at Po0.01 at voxel-level and
cluster size corrected at Po0.05 (two-sided). The effects remained significant when co-developing abilities were controlled for.
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were indeed driven by age-related changes in white matter
structure in these regions that specifically explained the devel-
opment of false belief understanding.
Connectivity analysis. To see within which tracts the regions
found in the TBSS analysis were located, probabilistic tracto-
graphy was seeded in these regions. The resulting tracts are listed
in Table 1 (for details see Methods). The three clusters in the right
posterior MTG and TPJ and in the left MTG projected to the
arcuate fascicle bilaterally, which connects posterior temporal
regions with the IFG dorsally, and to the extreme capsule fibre
system ventrally. Seeding in the two clusters in the more
medial white matter of the left STG and ITG and in the right
vMPFC yielded streamlines along the ventral left and right
IFOF. Finally, seeding in the two medial right clusters yielded an
inter-hemispheric connection between the bilateral vMPFC and
the bilateral PC through the CC.
Next, we wanted to specify how and where connectivity in
these tracts was related to the children’s false belief under-
standing. To this end, we correlated the streamline densities
obtained from tractography with the children’s individual false
belief scores, while controlling for FA in the respective seed
region (see Methods for details). This showed a significant
correlation of the false belief score with the streamline density at
the anterior tip of the left and right arcuate fascicle in the anterior
IFG (Brodmann Area [BA] 45) and within the right IFOF in the
MTG, (see Fig. 2 and Table 2; cluster size corrected at Po0.05
Table 1 | Correlations of false belief score with FA in TBSS analysis and WM tracts resulting from tractography when seeding in
these regions.
WM in/near MNI coordinates CoG Size in voxels P value Correlation coefficient r Tractography WM tracts
rTPJ 37  50 30 66 10 12 0.43 AF, ECFS
rpMTG/TPJ 47  51 14 49 0.003 0.41 AF, ECFS
lMTG 48  18  20 63 0.0004 0.44 AF, ECFS, ILF
lITG  33  13  13 63 0.0002 0.42 IFOF, ILF
lSTG  38  32 2 35 0.01 0.40 IFOF
rvMPFC 28 46 4 31 0.04 0.41 IFOF, CC
rSPL/PC 28  64 28 34 0.01 0.38 CC
lThalamus  3  12 0 18 0.0004 0.42 aTR
a, anterior; AF, arcuate fascicle; CC, corpus callosum; CoG, centre of gravity; ECFS, extreme capsule fibre system; FA, fractional anisotropy; IFOF, inferior fronto-occipital fascicle; ILF, inferior longitudinal
fascicle; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; l, left; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; MTG, middle temporal gyrus; p, posterior; PC, precuneus; r, right; SPL, superior parietal lobule; STG, superior temporal
gyrus; TBSS, tract-based spatial statistics; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; TR, thalamic radiation; vMPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; WM, white matter.
Seeds for tractography from TBSS analysisCorrelation of streamline density with false belief score
a b c
Figure 2 | Correlation of false belief score with streamline density. The streamline density correlated with the children’s false belief scores (N¼43,
correlating regions in red, cluster size corrected at Po0.05 (two-sided), Bonferroni corrected for the number of tracts, see also Table 2): (a) in the left IFG
at the anterior tip of the left arcuate fascicle; (b) in the right IFG at the anterior tip of the right arcuate fascicle; and (c) in the right MTG along the IFOF. The
effects were independent of age and of co-developing abilities.
Table 2 | Correlations of false belief score with streamline density.
WM tract Region of cluster MNI coordinates CoG Size in voxels P value* Correlation coefficient r
lAF IFG  30 37 17 61 0.03 0.46
rAF IFG 33 31 25 67 0.002 0.45
rIFOF MTG 42  3  25 24 0.002 0.46
AF, arcuate fascicle; CoG, centre of gravity; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IFOF, inferior fronto-occipital fascicle; l, left; MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute; MTG, middle temporal gyrus; r, right; WM, white
matter.
*Adjusted according to Bonferroni for number of tracts (n¼ 8)
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and Bonferroni corrected for the number of tracts). The effect in
the arcuate fascicle remained significant when controlling for age,
executive functions, linguistic abilities and implicit belief-related
anticipation as covariates in a multiple regression. The effect in
the IFOF proved to be age-independent, but was no longer
significant when all three executive function tasks or the sentence
comprehension task were controlled for. An additional tractogra-
phy, restricted to dorsal pathways only, confirmed that the observed
effects in the IFG stemmed from streamlines of the arcuate fascicle
(see Methods). Stronger dorsal connectivity from the MTG/TPJ to
more anterior portions of the IFG thus specifically explained
explicit false belief understanding, independently of age and of co-
developing cognitive abilities.
Discussion
A milestone of human cognitive development is reached around
the age of 4 years, when children begin to understand others’ false
beliefs. Until now, however, no neuroimaging study had looked at
the neural mechanisms that underlie this crucial step in human
development. In the present study, we found that this behavioural
breakthrough in ToM was associated with age-related changes in
white matter in the regions involved in belief processing in fMRI
studies with adults and older children. More specifically, we
showed that 3- and 4-year-old children’s false belief scores
correlated with age-related increases in FA in the white matter
around the right TPJ, left MTG, right vMPFC and right PC. These
relations were independent of co-developing abilities known to
correlate with ToM, that is, of children’s linguistic and executive
functions and of their earlier-developing implicit anticipation of
belief-related actions. White matter maturation in the core ToM
network thus specifically explained the emergence of explicit false
belief understanding in early childhood. This complements first
indications from an EEG study13 on oscillation patterns from
temporoparietal and medial prefrontal regions in relation to false
belief understanding. Our results go beyond these previous
findings by focusing on the maturation of brain structure, and by
allowing a precise localization of the regions related to the
emergence of false belief understanding. A battery of cognitive
tests, moreover, allowed us to demonstrate the specificity of our
effects for ToM.
White matter maturation processes reflect developmental
change in the structural connections between brain areas.
Probabilistic tractography with seeds in the above regions yielded
a network connecting the regions functionally involved in ToM in
adults: this network included the arcuate fascicle, the IFOF and
the CC connecting the left and right vMPFC anteriorly and PC
posteriorly. We correlated the streamline density in the pathways
that resulted from tractography with the children’s false belief
scores to understand how the connectivity strength of these tracts
was related to the developmental breakthrough in explicit false
belief understanding. This approach underlined the importance
of two temporoparietal-prefrontal pathways for the development
of a mature representational ToM: a ventral pathway via the IFOF
and a dorsal pathway via the arcuate fascicle. In the right IFOF, a
correlation was found in a relatively small region in the MTG. For
the arcuate fascicle, false belief understanding correlated with the
streamline density at its anterior tip in IFG (BA 45) bilaterally.
This correlation was age-independent and proved to be
independent of language, and executive functions. This finding
points to a specific role of the connection to this anterior region
of the arcuate fascicle for mature false belief reasoning,
independently of co-developing abilities. These results suggest
that, in addition to white matter maturation in the classical belief
processing regions, the extent to which temporoparietal regions
are connected to anterior portions of the IFG via the arcuate
fascicle yields a mechanism for the emergence of mature human
ToM.
The classical view in which false belief understanding emerges
around the age of 4 years has been called into question by novel
implicit tasks which show that, already before the age of 2 years,
infants display different looking behaviours towards agents with a
false rather than with a true belief28,29. Whether this sensitivity to
others’ belief-related behaviour is a precursor of later verbal and
explicit false belief understanding has been debated intensely in
the past years30–32,35. Against this background, we compared our
findings for the standard explicit tasks of false belief
understanding with an implicit task of belief-related
anticipatory looking. This analysis revealed that FA only
correlated with the standard explicit false belief tasks and not
with the implicit task. Moreover, a commonality analysis for the
explicit false belief tasks, including the implicit task as a predictor,
showed that FA in the reported regions correlated with explicit
false belief understanding independently of the gaze anticipation
of the actions of an agent with a false belief. The association with
white matter development in the reported regions thus seems to
be specific for the emergence of mature explicit false belief
reasoning independently of earlier-developing anticipation of
belief-related behaviour. The observed independence of explicit
and implicit false belief tasks is consistent with behavioural data
that show that the implicit false belief tasks are passed
substantially earlier and dissociate from the explicit false belief
understanding in preschool-aged children27,36,37, as well as in
those with autism38. It is furthermore in line with an adult fMRI
study which suggests that explicit and implicit false belief tasks
recruit differential brain networks39. Future research will have to
follow-up on the brain regions and connections relevant for
mastering implicit false belief tasks. For this, a battery of different
implicit false belief tasks should be used, including anticipatory
looking as well as violation of expectation paradigms, so that the
robustness and reliability of different implicit measures can be
assessed. Moreover, such an approach would have to include
younger children at an age when implicit abilities emerge and a
developmental change in performance can be observed.
Considering the difficulties in performing MRI with infants,
this will remain a major challenge for future research.
In sum, the present neuroimaging results demonstrate that the
emergence of a mature explicit representation of mental states is
associated with age-related white matter maturation in the
core ToM network (that is, the TPJ, MTG, PC and MPFC),
independently of earlier implicit precursors and of other cognitive
abilities. Moreover, this crucial step in human social cognition is
specifically related to the extent to which temporoparietal regions
connect to the anterior IFG via the arcuate fascicle.
The arcuate fascicle is known to be involved in language
processing. It connects the posterior temporal region with Broca’s
area in the IFG, which have been described to support sentence
comprehension40,41. Here, however, the observed correlation of
the arcuate fascicle with false belief understanding was observed
for streamlines connected to more anterior parts of the IFG,
namely to BA 45 bordering BA 46 and was independent
of the children’s linguistic abilities. This more anterior part of
the IFG has been observed for the processing of abstract
hierarchies in non-language domains42,43. It has been argued
that mature explicit false belief reasoning compared with lower-
level ToM processes, such as anticipating others’ actions based
on their intentions or knowledge, requires one to build a
mental representation of others’ mental states6. Such a meta-
representation requires hierarchical embedding of belief contents
into the context of it being someone’s mental state. Abstract
hierarchy processing is therefore precisely the ability needed in
addition to belief processing in order to reason about others’ false
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beliefs. We therefore suggest a mechanism in which the
connection of the arcuate fascicle to more anterior portions of
the IFG allows the information transfer between temporoparietal
belief processing regions and hierarchical embedding of
beliefs as a meta-representation in the IFG, thus enabling the
developmental breakthrough in representational ToM. Future
longitudinal research will have to check to what extent the
relation of cognitive and brain development is causal and will
need to verify that our results are truly developmental and
not due to systematic individual differences between the age
groups.
Taken together, our results show that white matter maturation
in the brain regions associated with false belief processing (that is,
the TPJ, MTG/STS, MPFC and PC) as well as the extent to which
the TPJ is connected to anterior portions of the IFG via the
arcuate fascicle pave the way for the emergence of the mature
human ability to represent beliefs. Interestingly, in non-human
primates, who have recently been shown to pass an implicit false
belief task44, but not explicit ToM abilities46,47, the arcuate
fascicle is very weak45. The relevance of this pathway for a full-
fledged representational ToM thus points to a critical role of the
arcuate fascicle for the ontogeny and phylogeny of a core aspect
of human higher cognition.
Methods
Participants. MRI data and behavioural data of 43 normally developing 3- and
4-year-old children (17 children aged 3–3.5 years, M¼ 3.32, s.d.¼ 0.19, 10 female;
and 26 children aged 4–4.5 years, M¼ 4.29, SD¼ 0.17, 15 female) were analysed
for the present study. The data of another five 3-year-olds and one 4-year-old were
acquired but not analysed due to artifacts in the dMRI data set. Children were
excluded if more than 10 out of 60 acquired directions in the dMRI data set were
corrupted. Directions were removed due to intensity dropout caused by head
motion48 or due to artefacts detected in a visual inspection49,50. The sample size
was based on previous developmental dMRI studies with approximately 20
children per age group, assuming a dropout rate of 10–20% due to motion
artefacts. A power analysis with G*Power51 showed that the computed correlations
with N¼ 43, an effect size of r¼ 0.5, and an a-error of 5% had a power of
1-b¼ 97%. Parental informed consent was obtained for all children in accordance
with approval from the Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Medicine of the
University of Leipzig.
Cognitive assessment of the false belief score. The children performed two
standard tests of explicit false belief understanding27—a false location task4 and a
false content task5—on the same day as their MRI scans. In the false location task,
each child was introduced to a mouse puppet, and they were both shown a sweet in
a little bag and an empty box. The mouse then left the room, and the sweet was
moved from the bag to the box. When the mouse returned, the child was asked
three probe questions about where the mouse would look for the sweet, whether
she knew where it was and where she believed it was, along with a control question
to make sure the child remembered the actual location of the sweet. In the false
content task, the children were shown a familiar chocolate box and were asked
what they believed was inside the box. Every child expected chocolates to be inside
the box. They were then shown that the box actually contained pencils. The mouse
puppet then entered the scene and the children were asked three probe questions:
whether the mouse knew what was in the box, what she believed was in it, and what
the child itself had originally believed, along with a control question on the actual
content of the box. All children answered the control questions correctly in both
tasks. In each of the tasks, children could obtain a total of three points, one for each
of the three probe questions. The performance on the two tasks was highly
intercorrelated (Spearman’s r(43)¼ 0.879; P¼ 8 10 15). We therefore
combined them into a total false belief score with equal weight for each of the six
probe questions. This yielded a sufficiently varied and highly reliable measure
(Cronbach a¼ 0.894) suited to study correlations with other measures. The three
questions in each of the false belief tasks could have led to carry-over effects or
pragmatic pressure to give different answers to consecutive very similar questions.
To exclude the possibility that such effects might have influenced our results, we
replicated our analyses with a false belief score that only included the first question
of each of the two false belief tasks. This scoring yielded very similar results
(see Supplementary Tables 2 and 3).
Other cognitive abilities. To control for co-developing abilities, the children
additionally performed a battery of three executive function tasks27 as well as a
standardized test of language development (SETK 3-5, Sprachentwicklungstest fu¨r
drei- bis fu¨nfja¨hrige Kinder)33. Moreover, children’s implicit expectations of the
actions of an agent with a false belief—known to precede explicit false belief
reasoning in development—were tested with an anticipatory looking false belief
task27. These additional tests were conducted in two separate sessions before the
MRI scan, all within an average period of 14.7 days (s.d.¼ 6.8).
Executive functions. The children were tested on a battery of three executive
function tasks27—a Reverse Categorization task52, a Go-NoGo task53 and a
Delay of Gratification task54. The tasks were chosen to tap into the children’s
inhibitory control, response selection and cognitive flexibility, which have been
argued and shown to be particularly relevant for mastering standard false belief
tests25,27,28.
In the Reverse Categorization task, the children were asked to sort blue and red
cubes of two different sizes into a big blue box and a small red box with changing
rules: first matching the colours of cubes with the boxes, then the rule was reversed,
next according to the cube size, and finally reversed. The percentage of correct
trials in the three rounds following a rule change was encoded as dependent
variable (M¼ 89.9%, s.d.¼ 11.7%). This measure had a very high reliability
(Cronbach a¼ 0.899).
In the Go-NoGo task, children were asked to perform actions a duck puppet
asked them to do (for example, ’Clap your hands!’), but not to do anything the
nasty crocodile asked them to. It was checked before that children understood the
rules and were able to perform the movements. A d-prime value was calculated
Time
FB1
FB2
Figure 3 | Implicit belief-related anticipatory looking task. Selected scenes from the two false belief conditions FB1 and FB2. Arrows indicate the
movement of the animals, check marks or crosses underline whether the agent animal can see what happens or not.
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with correct NoGo-trials as hits and incorrect Go-trials as false alarms (M¼ 0.886,
s.d.¼ 0.172). This task was highly reliable (Cronbach a¼ 0.843).
In the Delay of Gratification task, children were seated in a small room with a
small portion of their preferred sweets (gummy bears or chocolate bars) and a bell
on a table in front of them. A bigger portion of the sweets was placed in a locked
transparent box next to it. The experimenter told the children that she had to leave
for a while, but if they waited until the experimenter came back without eating the
sweets or ringing the bell to call the experimenter, they would get the big portion of
sweets. Task comprehension was checked with two control questions before the
children were left alone for a maximum of 5min. The children’s mean waiting time
was M¼ 233 s (s.d.¼ 107 s).
We formed an aggregate executive function score for further analysis by
building the mean of the z-scores of all three tasks (3-year-olds: M¼  0.63,
s.d.¼ 1.16; 4-year olds: M¼ 0.33, s.d.¼ 0.76; age effect: t(42)¼  3.30, P¼ 0.002).
The aggregate executive function score explained a significant amount of variance
in the children’s false belief scores (Spearman’s r¼ 0.520***, P¼ 0.0004),
indicating that it indeed allowed us to control for the variance in false belief
understanding due to the children’s executive function abilities.
Language. As a measure of language abilities, we acquired the standardized test of
language development for 3- to 5-year-old children SETK 3-5 (Sprachentwick-
lungstest fu¨r drei- bis fu¨nf-ja¨hrige Kinder)33. The test included sentence
comprehension and production, vocabulary comprehension and production,
morphological rule building and phonological working memory. The mean
standardized T-value of all subtests served as independent variable to control for
children’s language abilities (M¼ 57.4, s.d.¼ 7.4). This measure was significantly
correlated with the false belief score (Spearman’s r¼ 0.306*, P¼ 0.046).
Belief-related anticipation. In an implicit belief-related anticipatory looking
task27, the children were presented with short film clips on a Tobii T120 eye-
tracker monitor showing an animal agent observing and following a mouse
through a y-shaped tunnel to one of two boxes at the two exits of the tunnel
(see Fig. 3). The children were first familiarized with the fact that the animal agent
would go to the box with the mouse. Then, the children were shown film clips in
which the agent had a false belief about the location of the mouse, which had
actually left the scene in the animal’s absence. The children’s anticipatory looking
a
Seeds for tractography
from TBSS analysis 
b c
d e f
g h
Figure 4 | Streamline density maps resulting from probabilistic tractography seeded in the regions depicted in grey with significant correlation of FA
and the false belief scores in the TBSS analysis. Left hemisphere, (a) arcuate fascicle seeded in the MTG, (b) IFOF seeded in the STG, (c) ILF, IFOF and
fornix seeded in WM below the ITG. Right Hemisphere: (d) arcuate fascicle seeded in the pMTG/TPJ, (e) arcuate fascicle seeded in TPJ, (f) IFOF seeded in
vMPFC. Medial: (g) corpus callosum seeded in the right SPL (WM near PC), (h) left anterior thalamic radiation seeded in the thalamus.
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was evaluated as a measure of their expectations as to where the agent would look
for the mouse. There were two different false belief conditions (FB1 and FB2),
respectively controlling for different non-belief-related strategies27,29. Every child
was presented with a total of 10 familiarization (FAM) trials, 12 FB trials (six of
each condition), and six true belief trials (TB1 and TB2) analogous to the FB trials,
except that the agent held a true belief (TB) about the mouse’s location.
Gaze data were analysed for a time of interest from the moment when the agent
had disappeared in the tunnel until its reappearance in the FAM and TB conditions
or until the end of the trial in the FB conditions. Two regions of interest (ROI) were
defined, each covering one of the tunnel exits and the corresponding box. During
the time of interest, the ROI in which the child looked first (first look), as well as
the ROI with the longer gaze duration (longer look) was coded. Since both
measures were highly intercorrelated (r(43)¼ 0.444, P¼ 0.003), the measures were
collapsed to the mean of first and longest look for subsequent analyses27.
The children performed significantly above chance in the FAM and TB control
conditions (M¼ 67.8%, s.d.¼ 12.8%, t(42)¼ 9.09, Po0.001), confirming that they
had understood the events displayed in the film clips and showed correct
anticipation when no false belief was involved. The children also performed above
chance in the FB trials (M¼ 53.7%, s.d.¼ 11.2%, t(42)¼ 2.14, P¼ 0.038). As
opposed to the standard tasks of explicit false belief understanding, there was no
significant difference between age groups (3-year-olds: M¼ 54.1%, s.d.¼ 11.7%;
4-year olds: M¼ 53.4%, s.d.¼ 11.1%; t(41)¼ 0.214, P¼ 0.83). This is in line with
previous literature that shows that belief-related anticipation is already achieved
before the age of 2 years28,29.
MRI data acquisition. The dMRI data were acquired on a Siemens 3 T TIM Trio
scanner using the multiplexed echo planar imaging sequence55,56 with a resolution
of 1.9mm isotropic (TR¼ 4,000ms; TE¼ 75.4ms; b-value¼ 1,000 smm 3; 60
directions; GRAPPA 2) reducing the scanning time to 5:32min. A field map was
acquired directly after the dMRI scan. Additionally, an anatomical scan was
acquired using the MP2RAGE sequence57 at 1.2 1 1mm resolution
(TR¼ 5,000ms; TE¼ 3.24ms; GRAPPA 3; 5:22min). Children were acquainted
with the scanning procedure by performing a mock scan a few days before the
actual scan and watched a movie of their choice on MR-compatible goggles during
the scan.
dMRI data analysis. Before preprocessing the dMRI data, volumes affected by
artefacts due to motion were removed manually, as described above. Motion itself
was corrected for by rigidly aligning all volumes to the last one without diffusion
weighting (b0) using flirt58 from the FSL software package59. The dMRI data were
then rigidly aligned to the anatomical image, which again had been rigidly aligned
to the Montreal Neurological Institute standard space and was interpolated to
1mm isotropic voxel space. Distortions were corrected using the corresponding
field map. All these transformations were combined before being applied to the
data to require only a single step of interpolation. The diffusion tensor was
computed in every voxel within the brain volume and FA maps were derived.
A common group template of the participants’ FA maps was created using ANTs
(Advanced Normalization Tools)60.
TBSS analysis. The participants’ FA maps were then correlated voxelwise with
their false belief scores using TBSS34. TBSS projects the individual subject’s
maximal FA values onto a common white matter skeleton, before applying
voxelwise cross-subject statistics. The skeleton was thresholded at an FA value of
0.2. The nonlinear registration was done using the group-specific template as a
target image. Voxelwise statistics were then carried out with a non-parametric
permutation test61 implemented in FSL59 with the false belief score as the
dependent variable, taking into account the non-normal distribution of the data. In
a next step, we controlled for the language and executive function scores, as well as
for implicit belief-related anticipation by including them as covariates in the linear
model61. In addition, we computed linear regressions where we controlled for each
of the executive function tasks separately, and for all the language subtests of the
SETK as separate covariates. This was done to make sure that we did not miss out
on variance that was only explained by one of the subtests due to the aggregate
scores. Reported clusters on the skeleton were significant at Po0.01 at voxel-level
and exceeded a cluster size significant at Po0.05 based on local smoothness
estimation on the skeleton with AFNI (3dClustSim and 3dLocalstat)62. In addition,
a similar TBSS analysis was performed for the other cognitive domains. The
correlation of FA with the executive function score and the standardized language
test are reported in the Supplementary Methods. No regions of significant
correlation of FA with the implicit anticipatory looking false belief task were
found..
Commonality analysis. To get a better understanding of the role of developmental
change in the effects found in the TBSS analysis, a commonality analysis63
was computed voxelwise on the skeleton including age and FA as predictors
for the false belief score. A commonality analysis allows the decomposition
of the contributions of several, possibly intercorrelating, linear predictors into
subcomponents explained by the unique variance of the individual predictors,
as well as subcomponents explained by the shared variance of all possible
combinations of the predictors. Our commonality analysis thus allowed us to
determine whether the children’s false belief scores were explained by age-related
increases in FA in a given voxel (common contribution of age and FA) or by age-
independent individual differences in FA (unique contribution of FA), while in
both cases the variance explained uniquely by age (unique contribution of age) was
controlled for. In addition, the children’s language, executive function and belief-
related anticipation scores were included as covariates in the commonality analysis
to ensure that differences in FA were specifically related to false belief
understanding, independently of more general cognitive development. This
analysis revealed that age-related increases in FA in the respective regions
significantly explained between 4 and 10% of the variance in the false belief score,
over and above the unique contribution of age and of the other cognitive abilities
(details see Supplementary Table 1).
Connectivity analysis. To see within which tracts the significant clusters from the
TBSS analysis were located, these regions were taken as seeds for probabilistic
tractography with MRtrix64 using Constrained Spherical Deconvolution as a local
model65 with the default parameters. Streamlines were started in randomly selected
initialization points within the seed regions until 100,000 streamlines with a
minimum length of 10mm were obtained. The tracking followed directions with a
maximum fibre orientation density (FOD) value of 0.1 and a curvature radius of at
least 1mm. The tractography was restricted to white matter. This analysis yielded
the tracts shown in Fig. 4.
Streamline density maps of the individual subjects’ resulting tracts were masked
in the common template space by imposing that at least half the subjects have
nonzero values in every voxel. This was done to ensure that correlations were not
outlier-driven. The individual subjects’ streamline density maps were then
correlated with their false belief scores using FSL randomize61, while controlling for
the mean FA in the seed region of the tractography. This was done in order to
ensure that correlations with streamline density were not driven by the correlation
of the false belief score and FA found in the TBSS analysis. We then controlled for
age, the language, executive function, and implicit belief-related anticipation scores
by including them as covariates in the linear model. In addition, we computed
linear models where we controlled for each of the executive function tasks
separately, and for all the language subtests of the SETK as separate covariates.
Reported clusters in the tract volumes were significant at Po0.001 at voxel-level
and exceeded a cluster size significant at Po0.05, in addition taking into account
the number of streamline density maps according to Bonferroni correction.
To confirm that the effect observed in the anterior IFG stemmed from dorsal
streamlines of the arcuate fascicle, we computed an additional tractography from
the seed regions in the left MTG and right TPJ, which we restricted to dorsal
pathways. For this, a termination mask was defined as a plane parallel to the
Sylvian fissure (see Supplementary Fig. 1).
We localized and named the clusters and tracts based on the MRI Atlas of
Human White Matter17.
Data availability. Data, in anonymized format (according to data protection
policy in the ethics agreement), is available upon request. The publication of the
script for the voxelwise commonality analysis is in preparation, and the script is
available from the authors on request.
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